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________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 This immigration case concerns whether Gurpreet 
Singh’s conviction under 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) was an 
aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA), which would make him ineligible for discretionary 
relief from removal from the United States. We will grant the 
petition for review, vacate the opinion of the Board of 
3 
 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), and remand to the BIA for 
further proceedings. 
I. 
A. 
 Under the INA, “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an 
aggravated felony at any time after admission” is removable 
from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Being 
convicted of an aggravated felony also makes an alien 
ineligible for certain forms of discretionary relief from 
removal. See id. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i); §§ 1229b(a)(3), 
(b)(1)(C). 
 
 Congress has defined an “aggravated felony” to 
include, in pertinent part, “illicit trafficking in a controlled 
substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21), including a 
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 
18).”1 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). In turn, a “drug trafficking 
crime” is defined as “any felony punishable under the 
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. [§] 801 et seq.).” 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). A “felony punishable under the 
Controlled Substances Act” can include not only federal 
offenses, but also state offenses. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 
133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013). And a “state offense constitutes 
a ‘felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act’ 
only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that 
federal law.” Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006). 
                                              
1 We have previously referred to these as the “‘illicit 
trafficking element’ route and the ‘hypothetical federal 
felony’ route,” respectively. Evanson v. Att’y Gen. of the 
U.S., 550 F.3d 284, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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 To determine whether a state offense proscribes 
conduct punishable as a felony under the Controlled 
Substances Act, we generally employ a “categorical 
approach” to the underlying statute of conviction. See 
Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684. Under the categorical 
approach, we “focus solely on whether the elements of the 
crime of conviction sufficiently match the elements of [the] 
generic [federal offense], while ignoring the particular facts 
of the case.” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 
(2016). We look “not to the facts of the particular prior case, 
but instead to whether the state statute defining the crime of 
conviction categorically fits within the generic federal 
definition of a corresponding aggravated felony.” Moncrieffe, 
133 S. Ct. at 1684 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
“Because we examine what the state conviction necessarily 
involved, not the facts underlying the case, we must presume 
that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least of 
the acts criminalized, and then determine whether even those 
acts are encompassed by the generic federal offense.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks and formatting omitted). And “our 
focus on the minimum conduct criminalized by the state 
statute is not an invitation to apply ‘legal imagination’ to the 
state offense; there must be ‘a realistic probability, not a 
theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to 
conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.’” 
Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-
Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). 
 
 But some cases involve convictions under state statutes 
that “list elements in the alternative, and thereby define 
multiple crimes,” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249, or that “contain 
several different crimes, each described separately,” 
Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684. The Supreme Court refers to 
5 
 
these statutes as “divisible” statutes. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 
2249. To these statutes, we apply the “modified categorical 
approach.”2  See id.; Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986 
n.4 (2015); see also Rojas v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 728 F.3d 
203, 215 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (noting the modified 
categorical approach applies “[w]hen a statute of conviction 
lists elements in the alternative, some of which fit the federal 
definition and some of which do not”). We apply the 
modified categorical approach to divisible statutes in order to 
“determine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was 
convicted of.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249; see also 
Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684 (holding the modified 
categorical approach is applied to divisible statutes in order to 
“determine which particular offense the noncitizen was 
convicted of”); Evanson v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 550 F.3d 
284, 291 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding courts should use the 
modified categorical approach “to determine which of the 
alternative elements was the actual basis for the underlying 
conviction”). 
 
 Under the modified categorical approach, “a court may 
determine which particular offense the noncitizen was 
convicted of by examining the charging document and jury 
instructions, or in the case of a guilty plea, the plea 
agreement, plea colloquy, or some comparable judicial record 
of the factual basis for the plea.” Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 
1684 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Shepard v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005) (“generally limit[ing]” 
                                              
2 The modified categorical approach is not distinct from the 
categorical approach, but rather a “tool for implementing the 
categorical approach.” Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
2276, 2284 (2013). 
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a court “to examining the statutory definition, charging 
document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, 
and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the 
defendant assented”). But “[o]ff limits to the adjudicator . . . 
is any inquiry into the particular facts of the case.” Mellouli, 
135 S. Ct. at 1986 n.4. 
 
B. 
 Singh is a citizen of India who was admitted to the 
United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2009. He ran 
two convenience stores in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. 
In November 2011, Pennsylvania State Police troopers 
searched his stores for illegal substances. As a result of these 
searches, almost one year later, the Clearfield County District 
Attorney filed two separate criminal informations against 
Singh, charging him with violating 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 
which outlaws “the manufacture, delivery, or possession with 
intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance . . . or 
knowingly creating, delivering, or possessing with intent to 
deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance,” (2) conspiring to 
violate § 780-113(a)(30), in violation of Pennsylvania’s 
conspiracy statute, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 903(a)(1), and (3) 
violating 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), which outlaws 
“[k]nowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or 
counterfeit substance.” AII-224 to -225.3 The informations 
did not specify the substance in question. 
 
 On May 1, 2013, Singh pleaded guilty to one count of 
violating § 780-113(a)(30) and one count of conspiring to 
                                              
3 The longer criminal information charged Singh with two 
counts of each of these offenses. See AII-224 to -225. 
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violate § 780-113(a)(30). Both Singh and the District 
Attorney signed a “Negotiated Plea Agreement and Guilty 
Plea Colloquy” describing these counts as involving a “PA 
Counterf[e]it Substance – Non Fed.” AII-239. Singh also 
signed a separate form document titled “Guilty Plea 
Colloquy.” AII-241 to -244. Paragraph 43 of the Guilty Plea 
Colloquy reads: “Do you agree that the facts set forth in the 
Criminal Complaint and Affidavit of Probable cause filed 
against you are an accurate statement of your role in regard to 
the charges to which you are pleading guilty?” AII-243 ¶ 43. 
Singh circled “YES.” Id.  
 
 The transcript of Singh’s oral plea colloquy indicates 
he pled guilty to “possession with intent to deliver a 
counterfeit substance under Pennsylvania law but not under 
federal law” and “criminal conspiracy to commit possession 
with the intent to deliver, a counterfeit substance, which is 
designated a counterfeit substance, under Pennsylvania law 
but not under federal law.” AII-299. The transcript of the oral 
plea colloquy, like the informations, did not specify the 
substance in question. Singh was sentenced to an indefinite 
term of imprisonment not to exceed one year less one day. 
 
 On April 17, 2014, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) began removal proceedings against Singh 
under the INA. DHS charged Singh as removable under four 
sets of statutory provisions: (1) 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 
for being convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (the possession offense); (2) 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), for being convicted of “a violation 
of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or 
regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of 
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Title 21)”; (3) 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), for being 
convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude” (“CIMT”); 
and (4) 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (again), for being 
convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(U) (the conspiracy offense). 
 
 On June 18, 2014, an immigration judge (IJ) held 
Singh was removable under sections 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i). To find Singh removable under section 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the IJ applied the modified categorical 
approach “to determine whether the offense for which [Singh] 
was convicted ‘relates to’ a controlled substance as defined in 
21 U.S.C. § 802.” AII-276. Looking to the criminal complaint 
against Singh, the IJ identified the substance Singh was 
convicted of possessing as JWH-122, a “cannabimimetic 
agent.” AII-277. The IJ noted JWH-122 “is listed as a 
schedule I controlled substance under the Controlled 
Substances Act” and accordingly found Singh was 
removable. Id. The IJ also applied the modified categorical 
approach to hold Singh was removable under section 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for being convicted of an aggravated 
felony. Five days later, the IJ found Singh removable under 
section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) as well. 
 
 Singh filed a motion to reopen and reconsider with the 
IJ. In support of his motion, Singh filed a “joint stipulation 
and clarification” between Singh’s attorney and William A. 
Shaw, Jr., the Clearfield County District Attorney, indicating 
that: (1) the Guilty Plea Colloquy form is a standard form 
used by the Clearfield County Court of Common Pleas in the 
entry of a plea; (2) paragraph 43 of the form “refers generally 
to the underlying factual allegations against the Defendant 
and do[es] not constitute an admission of any specific facts 
9 
 
except those to which Defendant is actually pleading guilty”; 
(3) “[i]n this case Defendant [Singh] plead[ed] only to the 
delivery of an unidentified counterfeit substance under 
Pennsylvania law”; and (4) “it is the understanding of both 
the defendant and the Commonwealth that the unidentified 
substance was neither a counterfeit [n]or a controlled 
substance under federal law.” AII-133. The IJ did not rule on 
this motion. 
 
 Singh then appealed to the BIA, which construed his 
unadjudicated motion to reopen as a motion to remand, 
granted it, and remanded the matter for an IJ to consider the 
“joint stipulation and clarification” in the first instance. AII-
072 to -074. On remand, a different IJ found Singh removable 
as charged. Singh again appealed to the BIA. 
 
 On appeal, the BIA considered only whether Singh 
was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for being 
convicted of an aggravated felony for the possession offense. 
It did not consider whether the conspiracy offense was also an 
aggravated felony. Because the BIA held Singh was 
removable for being convicted of an aggravated felony, it 
“f[ou]nd it unnecessary to decide” whether Singh was also 
removable under sections 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) and (2)(B)(i). AI-4 
n.1.  
 
 The BIA said it would apply the categorical approach 
described in Moncrieffe. It noted Moncrieffe’s qualification 
that “there must be a realistic probability, not a theoretical 
possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct 
that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.” AI-5 
(quoting Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685 (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). The BIA stated Singh was convicted of 
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“knowingly . . . possessing with intent to deliver a counterfeit 
controlled substance as well as conspiracy to do so.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 The BIA described its initial task under the categorical 
approach as deciding “whether possession of a mislabeled 
controlled substance with intent to transfer it to another 
person in violation of § 780-113(a)(30) is necessarily conduct 
punishable as a Federal felony.” AI-6. It held Singh’s 
“conviction record gave the Immigration Judge good reason 
to believe that the [substance] at issue in his case was a 
Federally controlled substance at the time of his conviction.” 
AI-7. The BIA looked to what it called Singh’s “plea 
agreement” and said it contained “an affirmative stipulation 
that the facts set forth in the Criminal Complaint and 
Affidavit of Probable cause filed against [Singh were] an 
accurate statement of [his] role in regard to the charges to 
which [he was] pleading guilty.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The BIA further stated that “[t]he attached Criminal 
Complaint and Affidavit of Probable Cause both identif[ied] 
the offending substance at issue in the respondent’s case as 
‘JWH-122,’ a synthetic cannabinoid that was added to the 
Federal controlled substance schedules by name on July 9, 
2012.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 
 Finding no “reported decision of a Pennsylvania court 
in which a defendant was convicted . . . [for] conduct 
involving a substance that was not included in the Federal 
controlled substance schedules,” AI-6, and that Singh’s own 
case did not involve that kind of substance, the BIA held 
“there [wa]s no ‘realistic probability’ that Pennsylvania 
actually prosecutes people under § 780-113(a)(30) for 
misconduct involving substances that are not federally 
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controlled,” AI-8. Accordingly, the BIA concluded DHS 
carried its burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence that Singh’s offense of conviction was an 
aggravated felony, and dismissed Singh’s appeal. Singh 
petitioned us for review. 
 
II. 
 The IJ had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. The 
BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 
1240.15. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
Although “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final 
order of removal against an alien who is removable” for 
having been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” id. § 
1252(a)(2)(C), we have jurisdiction to determine “whether the 
necessary jurisdiction-stripping facts are present in a 
particular case,” including “whether [the alien] has been 
convicted of one of the enumerated offenses,” Borrome v. 
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 687 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
  “When the BIA issues its own decision on the merits, 
rather than a summary affirmance, we review its decision, not 
that of the IJ.” Chavez-Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 783 F.3d 
478, 482 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
“We may consider the opinion of the IJ only insofar as the 
BIA deferred to it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Whether an alien’s offense is an aggravated felony “is 
reviewed de novo as it implicates a purely legal question that 
governs the appellate court’s jurisdiction.” Restrepo v. Att’y 
Gen. of the U.S., 617 F.3d 787, 790 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 
III. 
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A. 
 The BIA applied the categorical approach, rather than 
the modified categorical approach, to determine whether 
Singh was convicted of an aggravated felony. See AI-8 
(“[W]e find it unnecessary to conduct a ‘modified 
categorical’ inquiry in this matter.”). Although Singh never 
squarely contends in his opening brief that this was error, he 
suggests that in cases involving section 780-113(a)(30), “the 
categorical and modified-categorical approach must be 
employed to identify the type of substance involved.” Br. 
Appellant 27. We treat this as a request to apply the modified 
categorical approach. The government also says the modified 
categorical approach is proper, requesting that we “remand to 
allow the Board to apply the modified categorical analysis in 
the first instance.” Resp’t’s Answering Br. 9. 
 
 We agree with both Singh and the government that the 
BIA should have applied the modified categorical approach. 
In a recent immigration case, we held section 780-113(a)(30) 
is divisible “with regard to both the conduct and the 
controlled substances to which it applies.” Bedolla Avila v. 
Att’y Gen. U.S., No. 15-1860, 2016 WL 3443112, at *3 (3d 
Cir. June 23, 2016). Accordingly, reliance on the modified 
categorical approach is proper, and the BIA erred in 
concluding that it was “unnecessary to conduct a ‘modified 
categorical’ inquiry in this matter.” AI-8.  
   
B. 
 The government contends we should remand this 
matter to the BIA to conduct the modified categorical analysis 
in the first instance. It contends Singh’s “challenge to the 
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immigration judge’s analysis under the modified categorical 
approach is not properly before the Court” because “[t]he 
Board did not uphold the immigration judge’s analysis, and 
the Court reviews the Board’s decision and only the aspects 
of the immigration judge’s decision that the Board 
considered.” Resp’t’s Answering Br. 13 n.4. But the BIA 
attempted to answer the same question with which we are 
faced: whether Singh’s conviction under section 780-
113(a)(30) is an aggravated felony. And whether that is so “is 
reviewed de novo as it implicates a purely legal question.” 
Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 790. Accordingly, we will address 
whether Singh’s conviction is an aggravated felony under the 
modified categorical approach.4 
 
C. 
1. 
                                              
4 We further note the BIA contended it was not applying the 
modified categorical approach, but its analysis employed a 
feature of that approach. Section 780-113(a)(30) outlaws “the 
manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to deliver, a 
controlled substance . . . or knowingly creating, delivering, or 
possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled 
substance.” The BIA specified “it is undisputed” that Singh 
was convicted of “knowingly . . . possessing with intent to 
deliver a counterfeit controlled substance,” rather than 
“creating” or “delivering” such a substance. AI-5 (emphasis 
added); see also Commonwealth v. Mohamud, 15 A.3d 80, 90 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (describing possession as an “element” 
of section 780-113(a)(30)). 
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 Under the modified categorical approach, an 
adjudicator must “determine which particular offense the 
noncitizen was convicted of.” Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684. 
The BIA addressed only Singh’s conviction under section 
780-113(a)(30). That section outlaws “the manufacture, 
delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, 
a controlled substance . . . or knowingly creating, delivering, 
or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled 
substance.” 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). As the BIA noted, 
Pennsylvania law defines a counterfeit controlled substance to 
mean a controlled substance: 
 
which, or the container or labeling of which, 
without authorization, bears the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, 
number, or device, or any likeness thereof, of a 
manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other 
than the person or persons who in fact 
manufactured, distributed, or dispensed such 
substance and which thereby is falsely 
purported or represented to be the product of, or 
to have been distributed by, such other 
manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser. 
 
35 P.S. § 780-102(b). Pennsylvania law defines a controlled 
substance, in turn, as “a drug, substance, or immediate 
precursor included in Schedules I through V of [the 
Pennsylvania Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control Act 
(PDAACA)].” 35 P.S. § 780-102(b). Those schedules are 
codified at 35 P.S. § 780-104. 
 
  “The first task for a . . . court faced with an 
alternatively phrased statute is . . . to determine whether its 
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listed items are elements or means.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 
2256. Elements are “the ‘constituent parts’ of a crime’s legal 
definition—the things the ‘prosecution must prove to sustain 
a conviction.’” Id. at 2248 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 
634 (10th ed. 2014)). If the listed items “are elements, the 
court should do what we have previously approved: review 
the record materials to discover which of the enumerated 
alternatives played a part in the defendant’s prior conviction, 
and then compare that element (along with all others) to those 
of the generic crime.” Id. at 2256. “But if instead they are 
means, the court has no call to decide which of the statutory 
alternatives was at issue in the earlier prosecution.” Id. 
 
 When a ruling from an “authoritative source[] of state 
law” resolving this means-or-elements question “exists, a . . . 
judge need only follow what it says.” Id. Here, we have that 
kind of ruling from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.5 In 
                                              
5 Ordinarily, in matters of state substantive law, we look to 
“how the highest court of that state”—here, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania—“would decide the relevant legal 
issues.” In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 114 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  But “[w]here an 
intermediate appellate state court rests its considered 
judgment upon the rule of law which it announces, that is a 
datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be 
disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other 
persuasive data that the highest court of the state would 
decide otherwise.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 
239, 254 (3d Cir. 2010) (ultimately quoting West v. Am. Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940)). Here, there is no 
opinion or other “persuasive data” on point from the Supreme 
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Commonwealth v. Swavely, a defendant was convicted under 
section 780-113(a)(30) of “possession with intent to deliver 
and delivery of a [Pennsylvania] Schedule II controlled 
substance (Tuinal) and possession with intent to deliver and 
delivery of a [Pennsylvania] Schedule IV controlled 
substance (Talwin).” 554 A.2d 946, 947 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1989). The court held “[e]ach offense includes an element 
distinctive of the other, i.e. the particular controlled 
substance.” Id. at 949. Accordingly, drug identity—“the 
particular controlled substance” at issue—is an element of 
section 780-113(a)(30). 
 
 This holding is consistent with the weight of our prior 
precedent and other judicial authority. In Bedolla Avila, we 
held section 780-113(a)(30) “is divisible with regard to both 
the conduct and the controlled substances to which it 
applies.” 2016 WL 3443112, at *3 (emphasis added). In 
United States v. Abbott, we held “the type of drug, insofar as 
it increases the possible range of penalties, is an element” of 
section 780-113(a)(30). 748 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 2014). 
And in United States v. Tucker, we stated “[p]ossession (or 
manufacture, or delivery) of a ‘controlled substance’ is an 
element of the [section 780-113(a)(30)] offense; to prove it, 
the prosecution must prove that the substance in question was 
one of those enumerated in Pennsylvania’s controlled 
substance schedules.” 703 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2012).6 
                                                                                                     
Court of Pennsylvania, so it is appropriate to rely on a 
decision of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. 
6 In Tucker, we also “rejected” the contention “that 
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 487 Pa. 174 . . . (1979), stands for 
the proposition that the fact finder does not need to find 
which drug type was involved in the § 780-113(a)(30) 
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit has held a similar list of controlled 
substances consists of alternative elements, and is accordingly 
divisible. See Coronado v. Holder, 759 F.3d 977, 984–85 (9th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1492 (2015). 
 
2. 
 Because drug identity is an element of a conviction 
under section 780-113(a)(30), next, we must “do what [the 
Supreme Court] ha[s] previously approved: review the 
[Shepard-approved] record materials to discover which of the 
enumerated alternatives played a part in the defendant’s prior 
conviction, and then compare that element (along with all 
others) to those of the generic crime.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 
2256. “Whether one of these Shepard-approved documents 
‘contains sufficient information to permit a conclusion about 
the character of the defendant’s previous conviction will vary 
from case to case.’” United States v. Marrero, 743 F.3d 389, 
395 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 587 
F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
 
 Here, documents both Moncrieffe and Shepard 
identified as relevant to our inquiry in guilty-plea cases—
Singh’s plea agreement and plea colloquy—contain sufficient 
information to permit a conclusion about the character of 
Singh’s previous conviction. Singh’s “Negotiated Plea 
Agreement and Guilty Plea Colloquy” describes his 
conviction as involving a “PA Counterf[e]it Substance – Non 
Fed.” AII-239. And the transcript of Singh’s oral plea 
colloquy indicates he pled guilty to “possession with intent to 
                                                                                                     
violation.” Abbott, 748 F.3d at 159 n.5 (citing Tucker, 703 
F.3d at 215–16). 
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deliver a counterfeit substance under Pennsylvania law but 
not under federal law” and “criminal conspiracy to commit 
possession with the intent to deliver, a counterfeit substance, 
which is designated a counterfeit substance, under 
Pennsylvania law but not under federal law.” AII-299. These 
documents permit us to conclude that whichever drug identity 
Singh’s previous conviction involved, it was not a drug 
identity listed as a federal controlled substance.7 
 
 “[C]ompar[ing] th[e] element” of drug identity “(along 
with all others) to those of the generic crime,” Mathis, 136 S. 
Ct. at 2256, we conclude the elements of Singh’s crime of 
conviction do not “sufficiently match” the elements of the 
generic federal offense, id. at 2248. That is, Singh’s crime of 
conviction does not “categorically fit[] within the ‘generic’ 
federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony.” 
Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684.  
 
 The relevant federal “corresponding aggravated 
felony” here is “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as 
defined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug 
trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).” 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). As we have noted, a “drug 
trafficking crime” is defined as “any felony punishable under 
the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. [§] 801 et seq.).” 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). And the Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA) outlaws “knowingly . . . posses[sing] with intent to 
distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance.” 21 U.S.C. §§ 
                                              
7 Accordingly, we have no need to, and do not, consider 
whether the form document titled “Guilty Plea Colloquy” 
amounts to a “comparable judicial record of the factual basis 
for the plea” that would qualify as a Shepard document. 
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841(a), (a)(2). This is the appropriate generic federal offense 
analog for convictions for “knowingly possessing with intent 
to deliver a counterfeit controlled substance” under section 
780-113(a)(30). 
 
 The CSA defines a “counterfeit substance” as: 
a controlled substance which, or the container 
or labeling of which, without authorization, 
bears the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, number, or device, or 
any likeness thereof, of a manufacturer, 
distributor, or dispenser other than the person or 
persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, 
or dispensed such substance and which thereby 
falsely purports or is represented to be the 
product of, or to have been distributed by, such 
other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser. 
 
21 U.S.C. § 802(7). The CSA further defines “controlled 
substance” as “a drug or other substance, or immediate 
precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of 
[title 21, chapter 13, subchapter I].” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). 
These schedules are codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 to .15. 
By definition, a “PA Counterf[e]it Substance – Non Fed,” 
AII-239, or a “counterfeit substance under Pennsylvania law 
but not under federal law,” AII-299, cannot be a substance 
listed on one of these schedules.8 Accordingly, Singh’s crime 
                                              
8 The BIA suggested “Pennsylvania courts and prosecutors do 
not speak authoritatively as to which substances are included 
in or excluded from the Federal controlled substance 
schedules.” AI-7. It suggested “State courts and prosecutors 
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of conviction does not sufficiently match the elements of the 
generic federal offense,9 and his conviction under section 
780-113(a)(30) was not for an aggravated felony. The BIA 
                                                                                                     
clearly have authority to identify which particular substance a 
defendant was convicted of possessing or distributing, but 
whether that substance is Federally controlled is a matter for 
the Federal authorities to decide.” Id. In these statements, the 
BIA misapprehends the roles of the state court, federal 
authorities, and the federal courts in controlled-substance 
cases under the modified categorical approach. Both 
Moncrieffe and Shepard expressly direct federal adjudicators, 
whether sitting on the BIA or on the federal courts, to look to 
certain state-court records, like plea colloquies, when 
applying the modified categorical approach. Accordingly, 
relying on Shepard-approved state-court records to determine 
whether the substance in a section 780-113(a)(30) case is 
federally controlled is permissible, even when those records 
do not identify the drug’s identity. Furthermore, to the extent 
the BIA purported to fashion a new standard requiring only 
that the IJ have “good reason to believe,” AI-7, the substance 
at issue was a federally controlled substance, we reject it as 
inconsistent with the requirement that the government prove 
removability by “clear and convincing evidence,” 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(3)(A). 
9 Singh raised before us the question of whether “the proper 
date for determining whether [his conviction] constituted an 
aggravated felony was the date of the violation,” or some 
other date, like the date of conviction. Br. Appellant 33. 
Because the Shepard documents here preclude the possibility 
that there is a sufficient match in Singh’s case, regardless of 
which date is appropriate, we have no need to, and do not, 
decide this question. 
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erred in conducting a “realistic probability” inquiry, and 
concluding otherwise.10  
IV. 
 Accordingly, we will grant the petition for review, 
vacate the order of the BIA, and remand the case to the BIA 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.11  
                                              
10 We recognize Moncrieffe approved of something akin to a 
“realistic probability” inquiry. But in that case (and in 
Duenas-Alvarez), the relevant elements were identical. Here, 
the elements of the crime of conviction are not the same as 
the elements of the generic federal offense. The Supreme 
Court has never conducted a “realistic probability” inquiry in 
such a case. Accordingly, we believe this is a case where the 
“realistic probability” language is simply not meant to apply. 
11 We decline to address, and express no opinion on, any of 
the other arguments Singh raises on appeal. 
